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Pál Dunay (Geneva)
Subregional Co-operation in East-Central
Europe: the Visegrád Group and the Central
European Free Trade Agreement
Der Beitrag analysiert die Entwicklung, den gegenwärtigen Stand und die Zukunft der Visegrád-
Gruppe, eines der erfolgreichsten Foren für subregionale Kooperation in Ostmitteleuropa. Das Feh-
len formalisierter institutioneller Strukturen hat ein flexibles, für Änderungen offenes Arrangement
hervorgebracht. Gleichzeitig war es damit anfällig für Störungen, die mit einer stärker institutionali-
sierten Struktur vermieden werden hätten können. Während das vorrangige Ziel in den 1990er Jahren
darin bestanden hatte, das Erbe der Vergangenheit zu beseitigen, einen Beitrag zur Auflösung des
Warschauer Paktes und zum Rückzug der sowjetischen Truppen aus der Region zu leisten sowie die
Rückkehr der Länder nach Europa zu koordinieren, stehen heute die Integration in die EU, Hilfe
bei der demokratischen Konsolidierung der Post-Meciar-Slowakei und pragmatische Zusammenar-
beit in verschiedenen Bereichen im Vordergrund. Offen bleibt, ob die Gruppe nach einem EU-Beitritt
noch Zukunft hat. Der Autor ist der Ansicht, dass sich das Zentraleuropäische Freihandelsabkommen
nach der EU-Erweiterung erübrigen wird, während die Visegrád-Gruppe auch danach noch Restauf-
gaben zu erfüllen haben wird.
1. Introduction
Throughout the 20th century the role of multi-
lateral co-operation increased and resulted in an
extensive institutionalisation of international
affairs. This effect was both global as well as
regional in Europe, particularly in the second
half of the century. Integration has been regarded
a panacea and the liberal institutional approach
has been increasingly dominant in the theory of
international relations.
East-Central Europe only partially adhered to
the main trend, bilateral co-operation prevailed,
with the exception of the period between the
late 1940s/mid-1950s and the end of the 1980s
when the Soviet Union, a non-East-Central Eu-
ropean country, imposed some co-operation
frameworks upon the countries of the region,
notably the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(CMEA or COMECON).
There were three examples of multilateral co-
operation that can be mentioned as having had
some relevance in East-Central Europe: One of
them is the so-called Little Entente established
in 192021 between Czechoslovakia, Yugosla-
via and Romania, those countries which felt
threatened by Hungarys barely concealed re-
visionist aspirations (Hyde-Price 1996, 81).
The Little Entente was sponsored by France, and
strengthened in December 1932 by the creation
of a permanent secretariat. The second exam-
ple of multi-lateral cooperation was the co-op-
eration between the communist elite of Central
and Eastern Europe during the late 1940s and
the late 1980s. The third example was the co-
operation of opposition leaders, mainly civil
rights activists in the region, primarily those of
Polish Solidarity, Charta 77 and some Hungar-
ian civil rights activists.
None of the three could have any major bear-
ing upon the establishment of co-operation be-
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tween Central European countries in the post-
Cold War era. The experience of the Little En-
tente was not suitable given its anti-Hungarian
drift. The Little Entente could not be re-estab-
lished as it was difficult to conceive a co-opera-
tion framework, which was demonstrably
against one of the new democracies of the re-
gion tolerated by the world at large. The irrel-
evance of the Little Entente was recognised even
by those who, at least temporarily, wanted to
portray Hungarys security situation as a coun-
try surrounded by hostile neighbours, the suc-
cessors of the Little Entente powers (Szalay
1992, 1, 3).
The co-operation between the communist elite
lost its relevance with the system change in
Central Europe. Most of those who had estab-
lished close contacts earlier were out of power.
Despite the fact some of the former communists
have returned to power later this happened un-
der such different conditions that made the
former cooperation in fact largely irrelevant.
The co-operation of the former opposition
leaders had little to do with the situation fol-
lowing the end of the East-West conflict. The
situation has changed fundamentally for the fol-
lowing reasons: firstly, it was a largely informal
and sporadic cooperation between leaders ear-
lier; secondly, national interests have become
far more important than the past personal rela-
tionships and, thirdly, former opposition mem-
bers involved did not come to power in every
country of Central Europe following the revo-
lutions of 1989. In Hungary, where the opposi-
tion movement was small, the first democratic
government was not formed by members of the
previous democratic opposition.
In summary, regional co-operation in Central
Europe had no roots that could serve as point of
reference. East-Central Europe seemed doomed
to fall back to fragmentation and eventual na-
tional rivalries.
Most East-Central European leaders who
came to power after the so-called velvet revo-
lutions were inexperienced in their new profes-
sion, albeit many of them had clear political vi-
sions. No doubt, one of the most important in-
ternational aspirations of the countries of the
region was to attain membership in Western
organisations. Interestingly, at first this was not
evident with respect of NATO or the European
Communities. Initial efforts were given to the
Council of Europe, where the first membership
application was put forward before the multi-
party elections in Hungary (November 1989).
This was followed by nebulous requests ad-
dressed to NATO and the EC, like the one is-
sued at the Visegrád summit of three East-Cen-
tral European countries, Czechoslovakia, Hun-
gary and Poland. They referred to the total in-
tegration into the European political, economic,
security and legislative order (Declaration
1991, 1). The request for NATO membership
came only after the formal dissolution of the
Warsaw Treaty Organisation in July 1991.
The politicians referred to above were of the
view that it would be to their detriment to arrive
at a situation that would give the impression of
a fully non-integrated East, while at the same
time seeking to integrate with the West. Differ-
ent ideas to counteract the process were explored
as it was important to establish some co-opera-
tion in East-Central Europe. However, sub-re-
gional co-operation should not create an impres-
sion that it could be replacement for Western
integration. President Havel spoke about the re-
establishment of the relationship of the coun-
tries of the region with Europe. Polish foreign
minister Skubiszewski called the attention to the
dangers of disintegration in the region coupled
with nationalism (see Skubiszewski 1991). Pre-
liminarily, in a statement made in the Hungar-
ian radio on 1 September 1990, Hungarian
Prime Minister Antall proposed a co-operation
framework resembling the Western European
Union (WEU). It is clear from these early state-
ments that there was genuine interest in co-op-
eration inside the region. The struggle for re-
gional co-operation was effectively reinforced
by the support of the West. Thus, we can speak
of two mutually reinforcing trends that pointed
in the same direction. It may be interesting to
note that those co-operation frameworks have
proved their viability where both internal and
external factors co-existed. It has to be empha-
sised, however that there are regional co-opera-
tion groups which have come into existence due
to the expectations of the world at large, spe-
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cifically of the West exclusively. One can men-
tion the Southeast European Cooperative Ini-
tiative (SECI) in this respect. The two frame-
works whose current importance and prospects
are presented in this paper  the Visegrad Group,
or as it is sometimes called nowadays, the V-4
and the Central European Free Trade Agreement
(CEFTA)  are ones which were established
upon the initiative of countries of the region
proper and which have established themselves
in international relations in a lasting manner.
2. Brief history
The co-operation framework, later identified
as Visegrád group, was initiated by the Hun-
garian Prime Minister József Antall. In a radio
interview in September 1990 he raised the idea
of establishing a permanent co-operation among
Czechoslovakia, Poland and his own country 
states which, according to their own assessment,
were ahead of others in the transformation proc-
ess.
It is a fact that the West reinforced this image
for some time through treating these countries
differently than other East-Central European
states. It was the shared view of the three that
they were better prepared to integrate with the
West, their democratic system was more estab-
lished and their economic performance more
convincing. Bearing in mind that the Baltic
States had not yet regained their independence,
the three could compare their achievements with
those of Bulgaria and Romania and thus there
was good reason to regard this assumption as
founded in reality. At the inception of this proc-
ess appeared self-differentiation, which was to
become one of the decisive matters of East-Cen-
tral European politics.
The idea of a permanent co-operation between
Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary was not
particularly well defined and had to evolve in
practice. It was clear that there were two main
directions of the future activity of the group, a
negative and a positive one. One could summa-
rise the negative one as getting rid of the rem-
nants of the past, with a focus on formally ter-
minating such arrangements as the Warsaw
Treaty and, to some extent, also the COMECON
and completing the withdrawal of Soviet troops.
The positive one could be formulated as increas-
ing the international profile of the countries
forming the group with an emphasis on co-or-
dination of their Western integration. The former
would be a more urgent, the latter a more last-
ing objective.
As far as the termination of the Warsaw Treaty
is concerned, the three countries were united in
their belief that this co-ordination should hap-
pen in a reasonably short period of time. After
the conditions of German unification had been
set and the German Democratic Republic had
been absorbed by the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Poland started to share in the determina-
tion of the other two. This determination re-
ceived a new boost in January 1991 when So-
viet troops cracked down on forces advocating
Lithuanias independence. A week later the
meeting of the foreign ministers of the three
countries urged the earliest possible dissolu-
tion of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (Com-
muniqué 1991, 2).
This statement reflected the radicalisation of
the position of the three. Beyond the solemn
establishment of the group this matter dominated
the agenda of their Visegrád meeting. The War-
saw Treaty Organisation was dissolved, the So-
viet troops were withdrawn from Czechoslova-
kia and Hungary, and the promise was made that
they would be withdrawn from Poland as well.
The negative agenda rooted in the past was ful-
filled and thus exhausted.
The major question for the second half of 1991
and the first half of 1992 was whether there
would be sufficient cohesion in the group to
agree upon a positive programme and to put it
into practice. The programme was founded pri-
marily within the agenda mentioned above. This
was complemented by a more pragmatic point
on the agenda, namely the re-establishment of
trade relations among them. It was obvious that
these relations collapsed at the end of the East-
West conflict, and that it was not in the interest
of any party to establish trade barriers after the
end of the COMECON. These objectives led to
the declaration of the May 1992 Prague summit
of the three and the establishment of the Cen-
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tral European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA)
just before the end of that year.
In the second half of 1992, some problems
appeared that had bearing upon the Visegrád co-
operation as well. After the parliamentary elec-
tions in Czechoslovakia it soon became obvi-
ous that the federation would separate into its
two constituting elements. Neither the Prime
Minister of the Czech Republic, nor the Prime
Minister of Slovakia were particularly support-
ive of Visegrád. Vaclav Klaus tacitly started out
from the point of view that his country was more
advanced than its Visegrád group partners and
thus for the Czech Republic there was no need
for sub-regional co-operation. Slovakia, due to
its new statehood and nationalistic policy, was
not an easy partner either. Furthermore, there
was no stable government in Poland to facili-
tate co-operation either. Rather than entering
into details on the matter, it is sufficient to state
that it was a difficult half-decade that followed.
Klaus was reluctant to speak about sub-regional
co-operation and was ready to accept trans-
boundary co-operation at best. The relation-
ship of Vladimir Meciars Slovakia remained
tense with another member of the group, Hun-
gary. One could conclude that the decline of the
Visegrád group was due to the dissolution of
Czechoslovakia and the views of leaders who
came to power in the two successor states. How-
ever, I think that this would be a superficial,
short-hand conclusion.
If one takes a closer look, it can be concluded
that there were deeper, underlying reasons for
the decline of the group. Namely, the clearly
identified agenda related to winding up the
Warsaw Treaty and withdrawing Soviet troops
was exhausted. The forward looking pro-
gramme, the joint return to Europe was less
clear and fragile for several reasons. Firstly, fol-
lowing the divorce of Czechoslovakia, leaders
in Prague interpreted the situation as if the inte-
gration chances of the country had increased
after it had gotten rid of less developed Slovakia.
Such self-differentiation has not been unprec-
edented in Czech history. Secondly, the Czech
Republic felt that its geo-strategic situation had
changed, and the country virtually moved closer
to the West. Beyond geography, it has been the
long-standing view of the Czech establishment
that their country is different from other coun-
tries of the region. Since the second half of the
19th century, it could be argued that the Czech
land was more industrially developed. Between
the two World Wars, the point could be made
that Czechoslovakia was more democratic than
any other country east of the Elbe.
The third factor in the decline of the group
was that the size of the Visegrád partners was
more divergent than before. After the dissolu-
tion of Czechoslovakia, not all partners were
adjacent to each other any more (the Czech Re-
public and Hungary shared no common border).
The largest country of the group has had nearly
40 million inhabitants, the smallest a bit more
than five million. Poland, due to its size did not
have a visibility problem in the West, and thus
it had no need for the help of the group any
longer. Others also needed the group to assert
their visibility less than immediately after the
system change.
It was much more for these complex struc-
tural reasons rather than due to an individual
spoiler that the Visegrád group faced decline
and a number of difficult years. It was also dem-
onstrated that co-operation frameworks pay a
price for flexibility. They run the risk of being
put on hold more easily than institutions, which
may resist marginalisation better.
In summary, one may conclude that the
Visegrád group went through three phases of
development. The first two years (19912) rep-
resented the peak, symbolised by three summits,
several other high level meetings, and the es-
tablishment of CEFTA. The years between
199398 represented the period of low activity
of Visegrád for both objective and subjective
reasons. Since 1998 one could note a new be-
ginning of the group.
3. “You only Live Twice” or The New Life
of the Visegrád Group after 1998
There were several underlying reasons for this
new beginning of the group. The most impor-
tant one is a certain disillusionment as far as
individual strategies in approaching the West
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are concerned. Countries of the region learned
during the summer of 1997 that the Atlantic
Alliance as well as the European Union would
enlarge not with individual countries, but
through the accession of groups of countries.
States of the region have become more realistic
and have largely given up individual integra-
tion attempts. Secondly, three of the four
Visegrád countries were invited to negotiate
their NATO membership and found themselves
in the Alliance in March 1999. Thirdly, Slovakia
was the only country of the Visegrád group that
neighbours on all the other three and had a new,
democratic government. It was in the common
interest of the others, for different reasons, to
help that countrys integration aspirations.
Lastly, he Czech economic miracle came to
an end that certainly contributed to increasing
the readiness of that country to co-operate
regionally.
Subjective factors accompanied the Czech
Republics readiness to involve itself. It was not
only the departure of Mr. Meciar that contrib-
uted to the consolidation of group cohesion but
that of Mr. Klaus as well. Interestingly, analysts
often stop short of addressing the role of the
latter and focus on the former exclusively
(Krzywicki 2000, 1). If one takes a closer look
to the revival of the group, it is obvious that
both persons played a role in that Visegrád got
stalled. The renewal was already boosted after
the departure of the Klaus cabinet by the Prime
Ministers of the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland in spring 1998 and revitalisation was
completed following the Slovak elections of
September 1998 that put an end to Prime Min-
ister Meciars third government.
The Visegrád group when revitalised took
advantage of the lessons of the first phase of its
development. There were thus not only lessons
identified, but also lessons learned. One can list
several lessons of lasting relevance. The
Visegrád group upon its inception was con-
ceived as an institutionally weak group. This
conception had its disadvantages, primarily the
potential that a single spoiler could undermine
it. On the other hand, it has carried certain ad-
vantages stemming from the flexible adaptabil-
ity of its agenda. Security and defence matters
played a much smaller role on the agenda of
Visegrád after 1998 than in 1991. There were
two exceptions: the support of the three new
East-Central European member states of the
Atlantic Alliance for the NATO accession of
Slovakia, a rather traditional international se-
curity matter, and the co-operation of the four
countries on involving Bratislava in the
Schengen regime,1  a new, largely non-tradi-
tional security issue. This challenge caused no
problem whatsoever.
It was similarly unproblematic that an impor-
tant part of economic development of the re-
gion, free trade, was separated from the Visegrád
group with the formation of CEFTA. The fact
that such (sub-)regional co-operation frame-
works can have a complementary role only is
not necessarily a disadvantage either. It makes
it possible to focus on topical matters of co-op-
eration knowing that regionalism will continue
to play a role in a broader, primarily EU, inte-
gration framework later.
The priority of EU and NATO integration is
unquestionable and fully understandable. It is
important not to attribute exclusive role to West-
ern integration and to find the adequate role in
regional frameworks. It was not necessarily a
bad idea to retain the closed character of the
group, as there were several other co-operation
frameworks, which assembled many more coun-
tries of the region often together with Eastern
(versus East-Central) or Western European
countries (Central European Initiative-CEI,
Central European Free Trade Agreement-
CEFTA, Southeast European Cooperative Ini-
tiative-SECI, etc.).
It is necessary to be somewhat more specific
and not confine the analysis to conclusions,
which can be interpreted both as pros and cons.
The re-emergence of the Visegrád group has
primarily been due to tactical and not strategic
reasons. The formation of the new Polish gov-
ernment in autumn 1997, which made the reac-
tivation of the Visegrád group a part of the gov-
ernment programme, was a deciding factor. The
Zeman government of the Czech Republic had
more specific reasons to be supportive of
Visegrád. Most importantly, if there was a per-
ception that it had been the Klaus government
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that effectively disbanded Visegrád a few years
earlier then it was logical to reverse this by the
cabinet formed by Klauss former opposition.
Also, the Czech Republic has had a high stake
in the stability and prosperity of Slovakia. Lastly,
Hungary was also highly interested in the re-
turn of the Visegrád group as it intended to find
a framework to rebuilding relations with Slo-
vakia after the departure of the Meciar govern-
ment (Lukac 2000, 33). Furthermore, Orbans
foreign policy team wanted to present the Prime
Minister as a per se international actor in spite
of the fact he was largely insensitive to foreign
policy matters. The reactivation of the Visegrád
group was a particularly suitable objective as it
was an area where the previous Socialist-Lib-
eral coalition of Hungary, due to circumstances
beyond its control, was unable to achieve any
progress.
It can be summarised that, beyond tactical
interests, it was Slovakia that was in the centre
of the groups revitalisation. It was the main
objective to help Slovakia catch up with the
other three members of the group and to sup-
port the consolidation of democracy in that
country. Due to the outcome of the Slovak elec-
tions of autumn 2002 the integration of the coun-
try into NATO and the EU can continue. In case
of NATO the three Visegrád neighbours may
continue to share their experiences and lend
support to Slovakia. In case of the EU the four
countries will join it the same day and together
with another six countries.
The fact that each of the four countries is in
the same situation and has EU accession as a
common goal may hold the group together more
than the matters mentioned above. It has to be
noted, however, that currently the emphasis of
the four Visegrád states is on achieving favour-
able conditions for accession and to complete
the process at the earliest possible time. As ac-
cession may be concluded soon this objective
does not guarantee a particularly long time-span
to the Visegrád co-operation.
Since November 2001 it has been noted that
the EU is heading to a big bang enlargement,
inviting ten countries, among them eight East-
Central Europeans, to join. As the four coun-
tries have thus lost their privileged status it is
an open question as to whether Visegrád is still
the most appropriate framework within which
to harmonise the negotiating position on the EU
accession talks.2  New members will also have
common interests after accession, bearing in
mind the extensive transitory measures the Un-
ion intends to introduce vis-à-vis all of them.
This policy will make them equal members only
several years after gaining membership. In this
respect again, however, many more countries
will share common interests rather than only the
four Visegrád states. In the light of these facts it
is an open question as to whether there will be
sufficient common interest to keep Visegrád
alive. Most probably there will be residual in-
terests to keep up regionalism in the Visegrád
group after EU accession, such as joint devel-
opment of the infrastructure, e.g. addressing en-
vironmental problems, and pooling the resources
to carry out such projects.
Beyond the strategic fragility that stems
from the fact of the upcoming full Western in-
tegration of the Visegrád group, there are indi-
cations that the cohesion of the group is weaker
than that of other international institutions. Two
examples have demonstrated this recently. In
February 2002, when the four Visegrád states
confronted the first official offer of the EU
concerning direct agricultural payments and the
candidates access to structural funds, they de-
cided to react jointly to the offer of the Union.
The statement should have been issued at the
meeting of the four Prime Ministers. The Hun-
garian government, the presidency in office,
made the statement available on its website pre-
maturely. In reaction to this, the summit meet-
ing was cancelled. This action, taken on the part
of one member solely, shed light on the atmos-
phere and reflected little confidence between the
parties. Hungary tried to portray the matter as a
technical mistake whereas Poland, for in-
stance, was of the view that the meeting had to
be postponed due to the lack of goodwill of
Hungary3  (Varsó 2002).
It was far more important when the Hungar-
ian Prime Minister Orban made a statement in
front of a committee of the European Parliament
where he rejected the so-called Bene decrees.
It was certainly a divisive issue of post-World
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War II history as some of these decrees estab-
lished the collective guilt of Germans and Hun-
garians in Czechoslovakia during the war and
resulted in their mass expulsion. There were
Germany, Austria and Hungary on one side and
the two successor states of Czechoslovakia on
the other. It was arguable that collective guilt
is an invention that has no place in the 21st cen-
tury (Prága 2002) as Orban tried to legitimise
his statement. On the other hand, it was obvi-
ously a matter that could not be raised without
damaging the unity of the Visegrád group, di-
viding it right in the middle, unavoidably alien-
ating the Czech and the Slovak governments. It
was on this basis that the foreign minister of
Poland, Cimoszewicz, stated: despite disputes
and manifestations of disloyalty that we witness
within the Visegrád group, it still remains an
important direction of our policy in the Central
European region. (Information 2002, 4; em-
phasis added).
The case can be contemplated on different
levels. On the interstate level among the
Visegrád states it was unfortunate as it created
a dispute before the final phase of the EU ac-
cession talks of the four countries and before
the invitation of Slovakia to negotiate her NATO
membership. Close co-operation among them
was particularly important during this period.
The actions of Hungary shaped another divi-
sion between two EU member states and two
candidate countries, between Austria and Ger-
many on the one hand and the Czech Republic
and Slovakia on the other. This could have in-
terfered with the enlargement process and de-
lay it. Due to the group approach of the EU, this
could hurt Hungarian interests as well. It was
furthermore an unfortunate interference in the
domestic politics of Germany in the beginning
of the election campaign. It resulted in a situa-
tion wherein the German Chancellor had to can-
cel his Prague visit due to the ensuing debate
how to address the issue of the Bene decrees.
Beyond the institutional and the interstate as-
pects it is worth highlighting a third layer of the
matter, party politics. There is no direct evidence
of the importance of this layer. However, it is a
fact that the CDU/CSU candidate for chancel-
lor, Edmund Stoiber, had visited the party con-
gress of FIDESZ in Budapest just a few days
before Orbans statement was made. Bearing in
mind the close ideologically based relationship
of Stoiber and Orban, the personal dislike of
Orban to social democrats as well as the poor
personal chemistry between Schröder and Orban
there is every reason to assume that the Hun-
garian premier was willing to do a service to his
Bavarian counterpart and thus cause damage to
the German Chancellor in office.4
As in case of most complex political matters
it is impossible to present a black and white pic-
ture. One can share Orbans assessment and state
we have been standing always, everywhere, on
every issue on the side of human dignity either
when we are directly affected or when we arent
(Prága 2002). It is also possible to conclude, as
a Czech journal did, that it was not the Hun-
garian Prime Minister who ruined the Visegrád
four, rather the sick Czech and Slovak fear from
the abolition of the Bene decrees ... The Czech
and Slovak governments, and not the Hungar-
ian, have thus recognised that the Bene decrees
are more important for Prague and Bratislava
than the Visegrád co-operation. (Zima 2002).
It may be just as legitimate to conclude that the
Hungarian Prime Minister with his undiplomatic
and badly timed statement weakened the cohe-
sion of the group unnecessarily. Due to the April
2002 elections in Hungary which the conserva-
tives lost, the Visegrád co-operation could get
beyond these problems.
At the first summit meeting held after the
change of government in Hungary it was de-
cided to continue all the positive processes
among the four countries and not to deal with
the grievances of the past. The Bene decrees
were not mentioned at all  as outgoing Czech
Prime Minister Zeman put it after the meeting,
for the reason they have already been addressed
too much anyway (Sztankóczy 2002). One
could wallpaper the problems by saying dif-
ferences in approach are absolutely legitimate,
and differences in opinion do not imply that the
Visegrád co-operation does not work (Lukac
2001, 16). This statement is certainly correct. It
is open to question, however, whether or not
the brutal disloyalty of Prime Minister Orban
to two of his Visegrád group partners has not
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gone beyond the point that it could simply be
identified as difference of opinion. I think an
attempt to undermine the strategic interests of
partners vis-à-vis two EU member-states in the
highly sensitive pre-accession period, as the ref-
erence to the Bene decrees did, goes beyond it
and should be regarded a major political mis-
take. Shortly before the end of the EU acces-
sion talks the parties have understandably agreed
to hold meetings of the chief negotiators to those
talks and the delegates to the European Con-
vention (Medgyessy 2002).
For the time being, it seems that leaders of
the Visegrád group intend to keep their co-op-
eration alive on another basis. Namely, they have
declared to focus on some issues of common
interest. One could say they have all been spe-
cific so-called low politics matters. The meet-
ing of the Prime Ministers held in Bratislava in
May 1999 had a comprehensive agenda, rang-
ing from co-operation in border and immigra-
tion affairs in the context of EU accession to
the harmonisation of combating illegal migra-
tion, illicit drugs transport and distribution,
weapon smuggling, organised crime and terror-
ism. An extensive list of items was identified in
the fields of education, culture, science, tech-
nology, the protection of the environment, in the
development of infrastructure and cross-border
co-operation. Some of the activities have had
as their objective to attract EU assistance, as in
the development of the infrastructure and trans-
boundary co-operation, others to intensify co-
operation in the group. It represented further
evolution in the group that a loose institutional
framework specifying the frequency of high
level meetings was established. A rotating, co-
ordinating chairmanship was also introduced
with a mandate for one year. The country chair-
ing the group identifies the tasks or priorities of
the group for the period of chairmanship. It
seems that great importance will be attributed
to EU third pillar issues, the exchange of ex-
perience and co-operation on the Schengen
agreement by the group as well as to the devel-
opment of transport, infrastructure and border
crossings, though the emphasis may vary.
Whereas the issues mentioned earlier were the
priorities of the Polish chairmanship, the latter
ones were those of Hungary. The Hungarian
Prime Minister called the attention to the fact
that it had been a weakness of the group when
the chairmanship had no clearly identified pri-
ority, this could prevent the deepening of co-
operation. The four states have also established
a so-called Visegrád fund in order to provide
resources for exchange programmes and joint
projects, e.g., of researchers of the participat-
ing countries. It was agreed in June 2002 that
the contribution of each government would be
increased to 600,000 Euro annually. This is ab-
solutely necessary in the light of the compara-
tively low level of grass-root integration among
the four and the little attention the non-profit
sector of these countries has paid to each other.
It is a major positive step that the group was
brought back to life with a significantly differ-
ent agenda compared to its first active period. It
has been apparent that the participating states
are determined to make the group a lasting com-
plementary element of their international rela-
tions. It is no doubt in their best interest for sev-
eral reasons. Even though a big bang enlarge-
ment of the European Union may eliminate the
once privileged status of these countries it will
help to retain their regional identity. It is not a
surprise that other, better established sub-re-
gional groups, similarly to the early-1990s have
been interested in co-operating with the
Visegrád states and thus with future members
of the European Union. It is a separate and some-
what unpredictable issue as to how extensive
and lasting this second life of the group will
be particularly in the light of the upcoming in-
tegration of the four states into the EU and that
of Slovakia into NATO.
4. The Separation of Economic Issues:
A Few Words on CEFTA
The idea of establishing some kind of eco-
nomic co-operation among the countries of the
Visegrád group has been present on the politi-
cal agenda since the October 1991 Krakow sum-
mit of the three. The ministers responsible for
international economic relations were well
aware that there was a sharp decline of inter-
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state trade among the former socialist countries,
and not only between the Soviet Union and East-
Central Europe. A further motivating factor to
establish a free trade zone in the region was that
the association agreements with the EC were
practically ready for signature. Their implemen-
tation meant that gradually free trade (except
for agricultural products) was achieved between
the EC and the Visegrád states. Without a free
trade zone among them, their products would
have been in a dis-preferential situation com-
pared to goods produced in EC (and EFTA)
countries. It was the intention of the parties to
establish a limited co-operation and not to go
beyond that point. Free trade was aimed to be
achieved in five to ten years. The conclusion of
the CEFTA agreement was delayed by the sepa-
ration of Czechoslovakia and the changes in the
Polish government. It was signed ten days be-
fore the emergence of the independent statehood
of the Czech Republic and Slovakia and was
applicable to the four countries.
Contrary to the Visegrád group proper,
CEFTA was ready to open its doors to other
candidates for EU membership. That is how
Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria joined the co-
operation framework between 1995 and 1998.
EU accession of five CEFTA members is ap-
proaching rapidly whereas two further members
(Bulgaria and Romania) will probably have to
wait for a longer period of time before joining
the Union. This will have a decisive impact for
the future of this group. In accordance with the
association agreements between the EU and the
candidate countries free trade has already been
established between the candidate countries and
the Union in industrial goods. Hence it will not
cause any problem that some CEFTA members
will join the EU earlier than others. In agricul-
tural products the same rule will not apply as
the association agreements do not provide for
free trade in that area. With the accession of five
CEFTA countries to the EU the trade regula-
tions of the Union will prevail and thus agricul-
tural free trade between them on the one hand
and Bulgaria and Romania on the other will
come to an end. This means that CEFTA has
become a time-limited arrangement, with its
time being based on the speed of the Eastern
enlargement of the EU. The upcoming winding
up of CEFTA would retroactively legitimise the
decision of the Visegrád states that kept their
group and CEFTA separate. Thus, it carries the
opportunity that the former can continue its po-
litical life span beyond the dissolution of the
latter.
Interestingly enough, reports about CEFTA
were confined to the failures and scandals in
the press, namely in cases where members of
the group introduced protectionist measures, be
they tariff or non-tariff barriers. They were
most often applied in the field of agriculture
and proved to be temporary. These conflicts
may have helped the EU candidate countries
preparation for membership as agricultural
matters are among the most controversial over
there as well. The sometimes severe, temporary
disturbances of multilateral trade relations in
the region do not give ground to draw conclu-
sions of lasting relevance.
There are two criteria on the basis of which
conclusions can be drawn. One question is
whether CEFTA had an advantageous effect on
intra-regional trade. The other one is whether
some additional, not necessarily economic, ef-
fects associated with such a sub-regional group
have also materialised. The answer to the former
question is a qualified yes: intra-regional trade
increased faster than the overall foreign trade
of these countries. One could notice a faster
growing phase of trade with other CEFTA coun-
tries immediately after accession to the group
and a somewhat slower growth at a later stage.
In spite of this, CEFTA trade has not become of
decisive importance for any country that belongs
to the group. The Czech Republic and Slovakia
are the exceptions in this respect, due to the
importance of their bilateral trade, which is quite
natural in case of two countries which used to
form one federal entity. The expansion of for-
eign trade is noticeable as a tendency and will
definitely continue when five of its members
join the European Union.5  For example in case
of the foreign trade of Hungary, the share of
trade with the CEFTA countries has increased
steadily over the last years. In spite of this ten-
dency it formed only 9 per cent of its total ex-
port and 7.9 per cent of its total import in 2001.6
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This is a demonstration of the limits of intra-
regional economic cooperation as well as of the
tendency of an EU centred foreign trade in the
EU accession countries.
Beyond the increase of mutual trade in the
region, it may be of some significance that the
countries of the group have increased their ex-
perience in the area of multilateral co-operation
and bargaining. It has been extended to a sensi-
tive field and the countries will take advantage
of this knowledge when five members of the
group will join the European Union most prob-
ably at the same time. At an early stage it was
also important that the political dialogue of the
parties to CEFTA also extended to this area.7
5. Conclusions
The Visegrád group and CEFTA have dem-
onstrated persistence amidst fast changing po-
litical conditions in East-Central Europe. Even
though their role had to remain limited and could
never compete with the integration effort of
these countries to become part of Western struc-
tures, they have contributed to preventing dis-
integration and to fostering regional integration
among the participating states. Visegrad was
important in its early stage to counter the image
of a disintegrated East as well and thus carried
the message that the countries of the region
could cooperate with each other and thus may
be mature for western integration in due course.
The importance of the contribution of sub-re-
gional frameworks should not be underesti-
mated. It is impossible to assess retroactively
how relations would have evolved without the
establishment and functioning of such sub-re-
gional frameworks. It is certain, however, that
the countries of East-Central Europe would be
less prepared for Western integration without
them.
The analysis of the evolution of the Visegrád
group and CEFTA, two sub-regional co-opera-
tion frameworks, demonstrates further that the
success of such groups depends on the genuine
interest of the participating states. External sup-
port and expectations of the West might help.
Without the drive of the participants them-
selves it may contribute to provisional success
only. This may be self-evident. It is not, how-
ever. Several other processes and co-operation
frameworks have been launched by external
players and could not establish themselves short
of the support of local players. It is necessary to
mention SECI, the Royaumont process or the
Regional Partnership initiatives in this respect.
The relative success of the Visegrád group can
be attributed to the cohesion of the four coun-
tries forming it. Whenever this cohesion weak-
ened due to changing power relations or diver-
gent political orientations of the members, the
group reacted sensitively. It has shown high-
level flexibility and adaptability, demonstrated
by the fact that its first life between 1991 and
1992 and its second life since 1998 have been
dominated by different agendas. The former
represented a balance between getting rid of the
past and finding the new alignment of the coun-
tries of the region. The second phase has been
clearly dominated by helping Slovakia to catch
up with the other three after the lost years of
Prime Minister Meciars reign, foster their EU
integration and find a broad agenda of pragmatic
co-operation. If we look ahead it is a more in-
teresting question whether the Visegrád group
will remain a major ingredient of regional policy
following the EU accession of the four states. It
is the question whether the Visegrád group will
have a third life under changing conditions
again after gaining EU membership. This would
require a delineation of a positive political pro-
gramme for the future.
The reluctance of the participating states to
institutionalise their co-operation has contrib-
uted to the flexibility of the arrangements, al-
though it has weakened the bureaucratic mo-
mentum necessary for their survival should a
non-co-operative attitude develop in some mem-
ber states.
NOTES
1 It was the prevailing view at the time that the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland would join the Euro-
pean Union earlier than Slovakia. Due to geographi-
cal reasons it was the pre-eminent interest of the three
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to include Slovakia in the Schengen regime together
with its three neighbours. In that case the length of
the border of Slovakia where control systems have
to be established meeting the technical requirements
of the Schengen system is approximately 90 km, oth-
erwise it is more than 1400.
2 There are indications showing into different direc-
tions. On the one hand, the four countries continued
to exchange views concerning their common inter-
ests in the process including taking common posi-
tions on critical matters. On the other hand, they have
also held meetings to co-ordinate the position of all
those candidate countries, which may be eligible for
membership soon (Meeting 2002).
3 It is interesting to note that the title of the document
that should have been issued by the Visegrád sum-
mit meeting is tellingly different. According to the
Hungarian foreign ministry it is Statement of the
Prime Ministers of the Visegrád countries published
by the Presidency in Office (Statement 2002),
whereas the Czech and Polish foreign ministries
websites carry it as Joint Declaration of the Prime
Ministers of the V4 Group to the Financial Aspects
of the EU Enlargement (Joint Declaration 2002).
4 For those who are not intimately familiar with Hun-
garian politics it is necessary to mention that since
the late 1980s party politics have never affected the
interstate relations of the country to the extent they
did during the office term of the Orban government.
5 The official website of CEFTA (www.cefta.org) car-
ries statistical data about intra-regional trade updated
only until the end of the second quarter of 1998 (!).
Thus it is necessary to rely on national statistics.
6 See www.kum.hu/siwwwa/file/K_1_2m.htm.
7 There are only a few good analytical papers on the
topic. Martin Dangerfield wrote several studies on
CEFTA (see also Dangerfield 2000).
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